The Rational Decision Making Essay

The Rational Decision Making EssayRational conclusion devising, along with the thinking process that it involves, is a issue that has been vastly researched, close to(prenominal) theoretically and empirically, and many assorted opinions have been, therefore, stated, since purpose making is perchance the roughly crucial neighborhood of gracious demeanor. As a result, a variety of social scientists have, at some point of their activity, occupied themselves with it and especially with its premises and their consequences.This essay allow attempt to answer the question of what is a sharp number finality, by contrasting the unmixed to the behavioural approach of shrewd decision making, along with the perfect and the move understanding assumptions that accompany them, as closely as the conditions chthonic which they hold true. It pass on in like manner, by dint of this process, try to luff that the classical approach lacks realism that would promote its widesprea d applicability and will further elaborate on the more than realistic concept of bounded demythologisedity. Moreover, a key range of the behavioural decision making, the heuristics process, will be presented and will serve as a bridge to the due south bulge of the essay, which will analyse biases, the, perhaps, almost valuable mob of barriers to rational option in organisations. Lastly, modes of overcoming those biases debiasing techniques will be demonstrated.But first, in entertain to decompose the essay question, ii definitions will be given regarding the rational thinking and the decision making procedure. According to Baron, rational thinking is the coveted kind of thinking that each of us would want to do, if we knew our best interests, in regularise for our goals to be achieved in the best workable way, the ultimate of which is profit maximisation (2000, p.5). Furthermore, we be involved in a decision making process, when we choose an action of what to d o or non so as to achieve a goal, after having judged a grouchy situation and evaluated the different affirmable let outcomes (Baron, 2000, pp.6-8). This judgement rump be spontaneous or thorough, it croup be perfect or satis incidentory, depending on the different theories and their elements that will be described in the main body of this essay that follows.Rational argue and decision-making The two theoriesA rational decision is one taken under the conditions of either perfect or bounded rationality, depending on which of the two tout ensemble opposed theories is taken into consideration in nightclub to relieve our behaviour. Although these two theories ar totally contradictory, a general model of rational behaviour which fits both of them was described by Simon. More specifically, he wrote that every rational behaviour incorporates some parkland elements such(prenominal) as that the decision master will analyse only a subset of numerous decision resources, out of which process, possible choice outcomes will occur. Then, according to an exact pay-off function, in the classical theory, or approximate, in the behavioural one, value or service is allocated by the decision maker to each of the possible outcomes, and the one with the higher(prenominal) value is finally chosen (1955, p.102).However, the two theories assume very different things and involve alterative consequences in their effort to account for a rational decision. The classical, excessively referred to as normative, the one that assumes perfect rationality and advantage maximisation in all decisions, derives from the traditional economic theory and portrays an economic man, who, while allocating just now resources, is also rational. He is awargon of all the germane(predicate) aspects of his complex and great environment, his system of preferences is stable and well-organised and he is so skillful in computation, that he mass calculate by himself the produced utility of all the possible actions that can buoy occur as a result of his decision and eventually, choose the one with the highest (Simon, 1955, p.99 Simon, 1979, p.493). In addition, it is possible for us to, correctly or non, predict forgiving behaviour without actually observing it. We ar able to do that, because of the way that the environment, in which this whole process takes place, is shaped (Simon, 1979, p.496).On the otherwise hand, the behavioural theory of rational decision-making, that originates from the theory of institutionalism the transformation of the economic theory in order to include the tied to market transactions, legal structures and is based on the concept of bounded rationality, is non as simple and brief and does not make as strong and absolute assumptions about the human cognitive system as the classical theory does. The knowledge and computational skills that the human agents possess are realistic and much weaker than the same that are taken for granted in th e previous outlined theory of utility maximisation. People, in this theory, are not expect to equate costs and return at the margin, as Simon puts it. Instead, the idea of satisficing is introcuded, where humans, far from optimising, try to achieve, through their rational, but slight competent than in the classical theory, reasoning, an acceptable, in terms of the gained utility, threshold. To put it plainly, scatty knowledge of relevant outcomes probabilities and of external environments state, non accurate evaluation of all possible outcomes and weak human memory are key factors for the bounded rationality theme (1979, pp.495-496, 499).Elaborating a bit further on the concept of decision making under the bounded rationality mise en scene, two are the main mechanisms that are needed in order for a decision to be make the idea of search and that of satisficing. The decision maker must search for the resources for choice, if they are not given to him initially, so a theory of s earch involve to be included in the bounded rationality model. Moreover, because the computational skills that wad possess are limited and utility of all different possible choices can not be measured precisely, they have developed a minimum satisfaction level that they want to achieve with their outcomes value, terminating their search and choosing that particular decision. Another feature of this approach is that the predictions it makes, can be easily time-tested through observation and empirical phenomena (Simon, 1979, pp. 495, 502-503).In an attempt to show that the behavioural theory of rational decision making is superior to the classical one, two important flaws of the latter will be briefly presented and a general, relevant to both approaches, conclusion will be drawn. A major flaw, that originates from the wild notion of the classical theory, is that agents decisions are made in a context in which all relevant, present details, future expectations and risks are incorpo rated, according to Kahneman, an assumption which rarely holds true (2003, p.706). Secondly, the, perhaps, most important pylon for the classical theory, utility maximisation, is severely challenged, since there is no existence of evidence that this is actually occurrent (Simon, 1979, pp.496-497). Connected to the previous fact is the economic model that indicates negative tilt demand curves which, according to Becker, do not necessarily portray rational behaviour that aims to utility maximisation, because there is evidence that batch who use other irrational decision rules, find themselves in the exact same patch (1962, pp.4-5). Conclusively, regarding the two presented theories, although in relatively simple and stable decision situations where incredulity is not present, bulk seek and achieve maximisation of their personal expected utility function, there are serious deviations from this procedure, when, even slightly, complicated features are introduced in the decision pro cess. The decision attempts in the latter context are explained by the behavioural theoretic model, in which the issue of bouned rationality plays a central role. This theory explains the wide variety of empirical observations that do not abide by the classical models assumptions (Simon, 1955, pp.103-104 Simon, 1979, pp. 497, 505-506).Heuristics and their twofold connection to decision-makingA subject of major importance that is closely linked to the behavioural or descriptive theory of decision-making, is the heuristic technique. Heuristics have been adopted by people as responses to complex and uncertain decision-making situations and are mental shortcuts, sometimes unconscious, that help them reason in a continuous way (Hammond et al., 1998, p.47 Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p.1124). They are generally part of humans problem-solving process and include very selective search through problem spaces that are a good shell out immense, as Simon explains. As soon as a satisfactory eno ugh outcome is produced, the search ends and this decision is taken, as explained in the analysis of the behavioural theory above (1979, p.507). Heuristics are astray used for the reason that they regularly accomplish the goal(s) they were summoned for, making them the, probably, most authorized and with strong properties medium towards a rational decision (Simon, 1965, p.183). One of the most common heuristic methods is representativeness, through which, probabilities of events are calculated in notice to how resemblant of an event is another. If the resemblance is high, then the probability that one of the events derives from the other is also high. Another way to attribute probabilities and frequencies to events, is through the availability or handiness heuristic, which indicates that elements of large categories are more easily retrieved from our memory and therefore higher probabilities are assigned to them. Lastly, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic indicates that peop le begin their syllogism from a familiar starting time point and, usually, their final decision lies not so far from it, being only mildly adjusted (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, pp. 1124, 1127-1128 Hammond et al., 1998, p. 48). However, the second attribute that connects heuristics to decision-making is that, through them, barriers to rational choice, may be created. The, perhaps, most important category of such barriers, namely biases, will be presented in the following second part of the essay and potential slipway of overcoming them will be demonstrated.Biases and ways to overcome themBecause of the essays length limit, the sole barriers to rational decision-making that will be analysed are biases and will be featured along with some techniques that can render their impact. Generally, the range of biases is really wide but there are some common causes that are liable for most of them. Stimuli in judgement and evaluation are not translated in a linear mode, creating distortion in the reasoning process, is one of the causes. A second one, is the unconscious automatisation of humans cognitive action when they are trying to recall information from their memories and their choice betwixt a narrow information base and finally the use of middle-level strategies, due to lack in superior ones, is a third (Larrick, 2004, pp.319-320).The anchoring heuristic that was mentioned in the previous section of the essay can lead to biases that regularise rational decisions. This happens because our thoughts and judgements are anchored by the first impression that we have on a situation and we rarely consider new perspectives to the situation, a fact that might lead to incorrect conclusions. Nevertheless, there are ways of overcoming this bias, such as being open-minded and viewing and adopting the cognitive strategy of considering the opposite, which alters the starting point of our reasoning (Hammond et al., 1998, p. 48 Larrick, 2004, p.323).In addition, a very common bias which severely influences rational choice in organisations is when decision makers bunk to choose alternatives that do not affect much the status quo. This happens often because people rarely want to hold responsibility for an action that can lead to criticism from colleagues and prefer the safer course of doing nothing, that poses a less psychological risk to them. It is also the case, that when there are many alternatives to a decision, because more effort is required in order to analyse all of them, people usually stick to the status quo. A way of overcoming this particular bias, which can have general applicability as well, is through the adoption of the motivational strategy of accountability. This technique indicates that people should, at all times, be held responsible for their actions, or in the case of the status quo bias, the non-actions, and they will have to explain the logic behind their decision. As a result, they begin to consider alternative possible decisions and, what is important, they take into account that the attractiveness of the status quo can wobble over time, thereby learning to evaluate decisions not only in terms of the present but of the future as well (Hammond et al., 1998, pp. 48-50 Larrick, 2004, pp. 322-323).Lastly, a bias that strongly influences the rationale of our decisions, is the sunk-cost one. According to this, employees, involved in a decision-making process, the majority of whom are managers, continue to support past choices, even if they do not seem valid any more and not exceeding them involves more losses than gains. Although most people know that these sunk-cost decisions are not relevant to the present one, they influence their minds and often lead them to making amiss(p) decisions. The reason why people seem to not let out those decisions, is because they are unwilling, consciously or not, to admit to a mistake, as Hammond et al. underline, since that would pain their self-esteem. People in business environments where the penalties for bad decisions outcomes are high, do not have the motive to terminate any such decision-relevant results, because they are hoping that they will be able in the future to somehow generate gains from them. The most efficacious way to tackle the sunk-cost bias is to consult the views of people who did not take any part in the decision-making process and will promising not have a biased perspective concerning it (1998, pp. 50-52). In order to avoid the possibility of getting tangled into a sunk-cost bias situation, people can engage into the technological strategy of group decision-making, in which the telling sample size of experience used to make a decision is widened, and the particular bias is statistically less likely to occur, if the groups experience and procreation is diverse, according to Larrick (2004, pp.326-327).ConclusionTo sum up the key points of the essay, concerning the first part about rational decision-making, the classical theor y, although attractive and relatively simple to comprehend, lacks a great degree of realism and applicability, since it presupposes perfect rationality and flawless computational ability of possible decisions outcomes for all human agents, a fact that leads to utility maximisation. On the other hand, the behavioural decision-making theory has been developed in order to provide an explanation to many empirical findings and data, which illustrate humans as boundedly rational, meaning that instead of optimising, they are looking for a decision alternative that meets some minimal criteria that are set by them. One of the extensions of a behavioural theory are heuristics, which are standardised judgemental operations that deal with situations that demand reasoning and assessment of probabilities. However, traps that lead to systematic syllogisms distortion, a unnumerable category of which, are biases, do exist and are sometimes caused by heuristic processes. They, nonetheless, can be co nfronted in several ways, the most important of which is awareness of their existence. Because human behaviour and decision-making are interlinked, more chapters in the theorisation of the latter, especially in more specific areas of it, are expected.